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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DALE N. STEVENS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20857 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant, Dale N. Stevens, was charged with the 
offenses of failure to have a driverfs license in his possession 
when driving, failure to display a safety inspection on his 
vehicle, failure to register his vehicle and failure to have a 
copy of a vehicle registration in his vehicle, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-15, 41-6-158, 41-1-18 and 41-1-40, 
respectively. 
Defendant was tried in a bench trial in the Justice 
Court, Eastern Uintah Precinct, Uintah County, Utah the Honorable 
Brent A. Feltch, Justice of the Peace, presiding (R. 1). He was 
found guilty as charged (R. 2). 
Defendant appealed to the Seventh Judicial District 
Court and was accorded a trial de novo on July 23, 1985 before 
the Honorable Richard C. Davidson. Following a bench trial, 
defendant was found guilty of all charges except for the offense 
of failure to have a copy of a vehicle registration in his 
vehicle. All offenses are class "B" misdemeanors. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
On November 5 , 1984, Off icers Victor Polek and Larry 
Crowl were p a t r o l l i n g Main S tree t in Vernal f Utah (T. 3 ) . 
Off icer Crowl observed a car that "looked l i k e i t had a 
phony l i c e n s e p la te" (T. 4 ) . The o f f i c e r s pul led the car over to 
get a be t ter look at the l i c e n s e p la te (T. 4 ) . The p la te 
appeared to be homemade or some type of an imitat ion (T. 4 ) . 
Off icer Polek asked the defendant, the driver of the 
car , for h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e (T. 7 ) . Defendant rep l i ed , 
"I don f t need one" (T. 8 ) . When asked t o produce h i s v e h i c l e 
r e g i s t r a t i o n , defendant's reply was the same (T. 8 ) . Officer 
Crowl, a f ter no t i c ing that the safe ty inspect ion s t i cker had been 
scraped off the window, asked the defendant i f he had scraped i t 
o f f , and defendant sa id he did not need a s t i cker (T. 2 8 ) . 
Defendant was i ssued a c i t a t i o n and was arrested on 
November 5 , 1984, but was re leased on h i s own recognizance the 
next day (T. 41 ) . Informations charging the aforementioned 
o f fenses were thereaf ter f i l e d in the J u s t i c e Court, Eastern 
Dintah Prec inct , on November 30 , 1984 (R. 3 - 6 ) . 
Trial was s e t for December 10 , 1984, before Judge Brent 
A. Fe l tch , J u s t i c e of the Peace (R. 1 ) . Notice of t h i s t r i a l was 
sent t o defendant on November 30 , 1984 (R. 1 ) . Defendant f a i l e d 
t o appear for h i s t r i a l on December 10th, and the Court therefore 
continued the t r i a l to February 2 2 , 1985 (R. 1 ) . Following a 
non-jury t r i a l , Judge Fletch found defendant g u i l t y as charged on 
February 2 2 , 1985, and imposed a f ine of $80.00 (R. 2 ) . 
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Defendant f i l e d an appeal to the Seventh Judic ia l 
D i s t r i c t Court (R. 2 ) . Trial de novo was s e t for July 23 , 1985 
before Judge Richard C. Davidson (T. 2 ) . On April 19, 1985, 
defendant f i l e d a motion to d i squa l i fy Judge Davidson (R. 20 ) . 
This motion was denied on April 29, 1985 by Judge Boyd Bunnell 
(R. 23 ) . Defendant's motion a l so included a demand for a jury 
t r i a l 
(R. 2 0 ) . The t r i a l judge denied defendant's demand for jury 
t r i a l on July 18, 1985 (R. 31 ) . A bench t r i a l was held on July 
2 3 , 1985. Defendant represented himself pro ££ . He was found 
g u i l t y on a l l charges except for the offense of f a i l u r e to have a 
copy of a v e h i c l e r e g i s t r a t i o n in the v e h i c l e . The court added 
$6.00 to the f ine previously imposed by the J u s t i c e Court as a 
post-assessment f e e . Defendant now appeals to t h i s Court. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant's f a i l u r e to fol low rules of appe l la te 
procedure are grounds for summary affirmance of h i s convict ions 
and sentences . He has f a i l e d to provide t h i s Court with l e g a l 
a n a l y s i s or c i t e to the record to support h i s c laims. Defendant 
was not e n t i t l e d to a t r i a l within t h i r t y days of h i s arrest 
under Utah law or under the f a c t s and circumstances of t h i s case . 
The appropriate s t a t u t e , Utah Code Ann. § 77 - l -6 (h) (1982) f 
merely requires t r i a l within t h i r t y days of arraignment (not 
arrest) i f the defendant i s unable to post bai l and the business 
of the court permits. Defendant was re leased on h i s own 
recognizance the day af ter he was arrested on the ins tant 
charges, and, in any event, t r i a l was i n i t i a l l y scheduled within 
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thirty days of defendants arraignment, but had to be continued 
when defendant failed to appear for trial. The State may 
properly regulate the use of motor vehicles on highways as a 
valid exercise of police powers under the Tenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution. The defendant was not precluded from 
asserting the Federal Constitution as a defense to the charges 
during the course of the proceedings below* Defendant's federal 




DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE 
SHOULD BE SUMMARILY AFFIRMED BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW PROPER 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
In his brief on appeal, defendant fails to provide any 
authorities or legal analysis to support his arguments on appeal. 
He refers generally to the United States Constitution but without 
specific reference to any particular article, section, or 
amendment thereof pertaining to the issues he raises.1 No 
statutory or case authorities are cited for any issue other than 
a miscite to "77-16" of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in 
support of one issue relating to his purported right to be tried 
within thirty days of his arrest. In State v. Amicone. Utah, 6 89 
P.2d 1341 (1984), this Court held that "Islince the defendant 
fails to support [her] argument by any legal analysis or 
1
 He does generally claim the right to personal liberty under the 
first, fifth and fourteenth amendments but fails to link this 
claim to any issue raised on appeal. 
-4-
authori ty , we dec l ine to rule on i t . " Defendant's convict ions 
and sentence should therefore be summarily affirmed. 
Defendant a l so f a i l s to make references t o the t r i a l 
record or transcr ipt to support pert inent factual a l l e g a t i o n s 
upon which he bases h i s l e g a l arguments (other than two re fer -
ences to the transcr ipt to support h i s claim that the t r i a l judge 
denied him the r ight to "use the Const i tut ion for a defense") . 
(Brief of Appellant at 2 ) . Under these circumstances/ the Court 
should assume the correctness of the t r i a l cour t 1 s judgment and 
affirm defendant's convic t ions and sentence. Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(6) (1985). State v, s t e g g e l l . Utah, 660 P.2d 252, 253 
(1983) (correctness of t r i a l cour t ' s judgment i s assumed when 
counsel on appeal f a i l s t o comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 
75(p) (2) (2) (d) (1977)—the rule that preceded Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(6) (1985); S tate v. Sutton, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 , 41 
(Oct. 2 , 1985) ( f a i l u r e to c i t e to the record i s grounds for 
affirming the dec i s ion of the court below); State v. Tucker, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (1982). 
In that "[ t ]he burden of showing error i s on the party 
who seeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 
1263, 1267 (1982) , the State should not be put t o the task of 
developing defendant's l e g a l arguments e i ther by supplying 
p l a u s i b l e l ega l ana lys i s for those arguments, or by searching 
through the record and making references thereto to support 
defendant's factual a l l e g a t i o n s . The ob l iga t ion to d irect the 
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Court to pertinent legal authority and to parts of the record 
falls upon the defendant not the State. 
POINT II 
DEPENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A TRIAL 
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF HIS ARREST. 
Should t h i s Court dec l ine to summarily dismiss t h i s 
appeal and reach the merits of defendant's c laims, the f i r s t 
i s s u e raised by defendant i s whether he was improperly denied a 
t r i a l within t h i r t y days of h i s a r r e s t . He a s s e r t s t h a t : 
"According to Utah Code, Book 77-16, under r ights of a defendant 
t o include a r t i c l e s (a) through (h) i t s t a t e s that a t r i a l must 
be held within 30 days. . . . " (Brief of Appellant at 1 ) . 
Defendant apparently refers t o Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 1 -
6(1)(h) (1982), which s t a t e s "In criminal prosecutions the 
defendant i s e n t i t l e d : . . . I t l o be admitted to bai l in 
accordance with provis ions of law, or be e n t i t l e d to a t r i a l 
wi th in 30 days af ter arraignment i f unable to post bai l and i f 
the business of the court permits ." Under t h i s s e c t i o n , a person 
i s e n t i t l e d t o a t r i a l within 30 days of arraignment (not arres t ) 
only i f (1) he i s unable to post b a i l , (2) remains incarcerated , 
and (3) the business of the court permits. 
Under the circumstances of t h i s case , defendant was not 
e n t i t l e d t o t r i a l within t h i r t y days of h i s arrest (or 
arraignment). He was arrested on November 5 f 1984 (,&££ "Utah 
Arrest and Court F i l i n g / D i s p o s i t i o n Report" in the Record of 
P lead ings ) . He was re leased on h i s own recognizance the day 
af ter h i s arres t (T. 4 1 ) . He was arraigned on November 19 , 1984 
(R. 1 ) . Trial was s e t in the J u s t i c e Court for December 10 , 1984 
- 6 -
(within thirty days of arraignment) but the trial date had to be 
reset because defendant failed to appear on that date (R. 1). 
Trial was finally held in Justice Court on February 22, 1985 
(R. 1) . 
Based upon t h e fo rego ing , t h e r e was no v i o l a t i o n of 
Sec t ion 7 7 - l - 6 ( h ) . 
POINT I I I 
THE REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES IS A 
PROPER SUBJECT FOR STATE CONTROL. 
Defendant contends t h a t , as a c i t i z e n of the United 
S t a t e s , he i s e n t i t l e d t o an "o rgan ic" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of 
locomotion (Brief for Appe l l an t a t 2 ) . I t i s wel l s e t t l e d t h a t 
t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o t e c t s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o 
t r a v e l on p u b l i c highways* &££ Cal i fano v . Aznavorian. 439 U.S. 
170 (1978); Kent Vt D u l l e s , 357 U.S. 116 (1958) . £££ Al£Q Ad2HL£ 
v. Ci ty of P o c a t e l l o , 91 Idaho 99 , 416 P.2d 46, 48 (1966) , 
Standish v. Dept, of Revenuer M,V,Dtr 235 Kan. 900, 683 p.2d 
1276, 1281 (1984); and Crocker v, Colorado Dept, of Revenue/ 652 
P.2d 1067, 1072 (Colo. 1982). 
I t i s also c lear tha t the S ta tes are granted broad 
police powers under the Tenth Amendment of the United Sta tes 
Const i tut ion 2 to promote public hea l th , safety, morals and the 
general welfare of socie ty . In Bastian v. Kingf Utah, 661 P.2d 
953, 956 (1983), t h i s Court observed: 
1
 "The powers not delegated to the United S ta tes by the 
Const i tu t ion, nor prohibited by i t to the S t a t e s , are reserved to 
the Sta tes respec t ive ly , or to the people." 
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It is the power and responsibility of the 
Legislature to enact laws to promote the 
public health, safety, morals and general 
welfare of society, [citation omitted] 
and this Court will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the Legislature with 
respect to what best serves the public 
interest. 
Moreoverf the "conditions for operation of a motor vehicle on 
public roads is a proper subject for state regulation and 
control." State v. Chancellor. Utah, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (1985). 
Defendant was convicted of offenses under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 41-2-15, 41-6-158, and 41-1-18 (1981) (R. 1). The 
respective v io lat ions for each section of the Utah Code were no 
driver's l icense in possession, no safety inspection st icker, and 
fai lure to register or expired registration, a l l c lass "B" 
misdemeanors (R. 1 ) . The State 's regulation of each of these 
v io lat ions i s a legitimate exercise of the State 's police power. 
In Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1913), the 
defendant challenged the State of Maryland's power to regulate 
the public s tree t s . The Supreme Court held: 
[A] State may rightfully prescribe 
uniform regulations necessary for public 
safety and order in respect to the operation 
upon i t s highways of a l l motor vehicles— 
those moving in interstate commerce as well 
as others. And to th is end i t may require 
the registration of such vehicles and the 
l icensing of their drivers. . . . This i s 
but an exercise of the police power uniformly 
recognized as belonging to States and 
essential to the preservation of the health, 
safety and comfort of their c i t i zens ; and i t 
does not constitute a direct and material 
burden on interstate commerce. 
235 U.S. at 622. 
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The Utah regulatory laws in i s sue c o n s t i t u t e a 
l e g i t i m a t e exerc i s e of a S t a t e ' s po l i ce power, and the defendant's 
claims t o the contrary are without merit* 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED 
DEFENDANT'S QUESTIONING OP WITNESSES 
AND DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT TO MATTERS 
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
AND DID NOT PRECLUDE HIM FROM RELYING 
ON THE CONSTITUTION AS A DEFENSE. 
Defendant claims that the t r i a l judge denied him "the 
r ight to use the Const i tut ion for a defense." He c i t e s t o T. 18 f 
50 in support of h i s claim. In the f i r s t ins tance f the defendant 
was cross-examining a S t a t e ' s wi tness when defendant suddenly made 
the fo l lowing statement: 
. . . t h i s whole case i s n ' t whether I was 
driving without a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e or not. 
The whole case i s did I have a r ight to do 
that . Do I have a right under the Consti-
tut ion? What are my r ights? That's the 
whole case . 
(T. 1 8 ) . The t r i a l judge, in an apparent attempt to get defendant 
t o return to proper quest ioning of the w i tnes s , ordered him to 
focus upon ques t ions such as whether he had a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e , 
r e g i s t r a t i o n and safety inspect ion s t i c k e r (T. 1 8 ) . 
In the second ins tance , defendant, in c los ing argument, 
attempted t o re-argue the same cons t i tu t iona l chal lenges to the 
e n t i r e proceedings, which he had repeatedly asserted in numerous 
p r e - t r i a l motions f i l e d with and ruled upon by the court (T. 49-
50; R. 7 , 9 , 12 , 14 , 20 , 2 1 , 39 , 40 and 4 1 ) . The judge had been 
f u l l y apprised of those arguments. Accordingly, he urged 
defendant t o focus instead on the charges and the f a c t s 
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surrounding them (T. 49-53) • The judge explained that defendant's 
concerns were for the l e g i s l a t u r e , not the courts , and that 
defendant should try t o convince them that t h e i r t r a f f i c laws 
should be abol ished (T. 5 2 ) . 
In the context of the e n t i r e proceedings below, i t i s 
c lear that defendant was not "denied the r ight to use the 
Const i tut ion as a defense ." Indeed, he v igorous ly asserted h i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arguments throughout the course of a l l proceedings 
prior and during t r i a l . His arguments were simply not persuas ive , 
had been previously ruled upon, and the t r i a l court was attempting 
to focus the defendant's a t t e n t i o n at t r i a l to areas of c r o s s -
examination and argument re levant to the factual matters before 
the court . 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL WAS NOT VIOLATED 
IN THIS CASE. 
Throughout defendant's brief on appeal, he r e l i e s upon 
the United S ta tes Const i tut ion as the so l e authority in support of 
a l l of h i s c laims. Indeed, defendant d i sp lays a c lear repugnance 
for the laws of Utah, saying "the laws of t h i s s t a t e do not apply 
to t h i s c i t i z e n " and "This State does not have j u r i s d i c t i o n in 
t h i s case ." (Appel lant's br ief at 2 - 3 ) . 
This Court recent ly observed in s t a t e v . Earl . 
P.2d , Utah Sup. Ct. No. 20066 ( f i l e d March 21 , 1986) , that 
the p a r t i e s had f a i l e d to d i scuss or re ly independently upon the 
Utah Const i tut ion in analyzing the i s s u e s before the Court. 
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Accordingly/ the Court limited its analysis to the Federal 
Constitution: 
We therefore have treated this case solely 
under the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and have relied only on 
federal law. We have not considered separate 
state constitutional standards/ even though 
we are aware that other states are relying 
with increasing frequency on an analysis of 
the provisions of their own constitutions to 
expand constitutional protection beyond that 
mandated by the United States Court. 2&& 
State Vt Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 750-52/ 653 
P.2d 942f 947-48 (1982)/ and cases cited 
therein. Since it was not raised herer we do 
not treat that question. 
(footnote omitted). Earl, slip op. at 4. Based upon the 
foregoing/ the analysis of defendant's claim that he was denied 
his right to a jury trial should be limited solely to whether his 
federal constitutional rights were violated. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury in all 
criminal prosecutions. However/ the United States Supreme Court 
has held that the right is not absolute. In State v» Nuttall. 
Utah/ 611 P.2d 722/ 724 (1980)/ this Court summarized the federal 
case law as follows: 
In Duncan v. Louisiana.4 the Supreme 
Court held the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a right of jury trial in all 
criminal cases which—were they to be tried 
in a federal court—would come within the 
Sixth Amendments guarantee. The Court based 
its decision on the premise that jury trials 
in non-petty criminal cases were fundamental 
to the American scheme of justice and thus 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching its 
decision the Court explicitly recognized the 
existence of a category of offenses which are 
not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury 
trial requirements. 5 
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In determining i f an of fense f a l l s 
wi thin t h i s l a t t e r category the Court has 
looked t o objec t ive i n d i c a t i o n s of the degree 
of ser iousness with which soc i e ty regards the 
o f f e n s e . 6 The most relevant ind ica t ion and 
the one which the Supreme Court has 
emphasized in de l ineat ing the div iding l i n e 
between "petty" and "serious" o f fenses i s the 
s e v e r i t y of the penalty authorized for the 
punishment of the o f f e n s e . 7 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , in Baldwin v . New York,8 
the Supreme Court was faced with the 
"essent ia l i f not wholly s a t i s f a c t o r y [ t a s k ] , 
. . . of determining the l i n e between f p e t t y 1 
and f s e r i o u s 1 for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment r ight t o jury t r i a l . " 9 In 
r e j e c t i n g a proposed demarcation r e f l e c t i n g 
the "felony-misdemeanor" d i s t i n c t i o n , the 
Court explained: 
"Indeed, we long ago declared that the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury t r i a l f i s not 
to be construed as r e l a t i n g only to f e l o n i e s , 
or o f fenses punishable by confinement in the 
pen i t en t iary . I t embraces as we l l some 
c l a s s e s of misdemeanors, the punishment of 
which involves or may involve the deprivat ion 
of the l i b e r t y of the c i t i z e n . 1 " 1 0 
Yet, while recognizing the a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
of the f e d e r a l l y protected right to some 
misdemeanors, the Court, fo l lowing Dnncan and 
the federal p r a c t i c e , 1 1 denominated of fenses 
which carry a p o s s i b l e sentence of more than 
six-months imprisonment as ser ious and 
subject t o the f e d e r a l l y protected r ight to a 
jury t r i a l . 1 2 
4 Dnncan v . L o u i s i a n a . 391 U . S . 1 4 5 , 88 S .Ct . 
1 4 4 4 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
5
 I d . at 1 5 9 , 88 S .Ct . a t 1 4 5 2 , s*e a l s o 
D i s t r i c t of Columbia v . C l a w a n s . 300 U . S . 
6 1 7 , 57 S . C t . 6 6 0 , 81 L .Ed . 843 (1937) £ £ £ 
AlSG C a l l a n v . W i l s o n , 127 U .S . 5 4 0 , 8 S . C t . 
1301, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888); Frankfurter & 
Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the 
Const i tut ional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 
Harv.L.Rev. 917 (1926); But see Kaye, Petty 
Offenders Have No Peers! 26 U.Chi.L.Rev. 245 
(1959) . 
- 1 2 -
6 ££& D i s t r i c t of Columbia v . Clawans. supra 
note 5 , 127 U.S. at 628, 57 S.Ct. at 663. 
["Doubts must be resolved, not s u b j e c t i v e l y 
by recourse of the judge to h i s own sympathy 
and emotions, but by objec t ive standards such 
as may be observed in the laws and prac t i ce s 
of the community taken as a gauge of i t s 
s o c i a l and e t h i c a l judgments."] 
7 Frank v . United S t a t e s . 395 U.S 147, 148, 
89 S.Ct. 1503, 1504, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); 
£££ also. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 4 , 
391 U.S. at 159, 88 S.Ct. at 1452. 
8 Baldwin v. New York. 399 D.S. 66 , 90 S.Ct. 
1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970). 
9 Id. at 68, 90 S.Ct. at 1888. 
10 i d . at 70 , 90. S.Ct. at 1888. (Quoting 
from Callan v . Wilson, supra note 5 , 127 O.S. 
at 549, 8 S.Ct. at 1303) . 
11 18 U.S .C. , Sect ion 1 def ines "petty 
of fenses" as those punishable by no more than 
s i x months in prison and a $500 f i n e . 
1 2
 In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania. 418 U.S. 
506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974) , 
J u s t i c e White explained, " . . . our 
dec i s ions have e s tab l i shed a f ixed dividing 
l i n e between petty and ser ious o f f ense s : 
those crimes carrying a sentence more than 
s i x months are ser ious crimes and those 
carrying a sentence of s i x months or l e s s are 
petty crimes." (at 512, 94 S.Ct. at 26 91.) 
Cf. finntt v. I l l i n o i s . 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 
1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979) 
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Defendant was convicted of three c l a s s wBn 
misdemeanors, each of which carry the maximum penalty of s ix 
months in j a i l or a $299 f ine or both. Defendant received a f ine 
of $86.00 in the ins tant case . Accordingly, h i s federal 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight to a jury t r i a l was not v i o l a t e d in t h i s case 
when the d i s t r i c t judge denied d e f e n d a n t s wri t ten demand for a 
jury t r i a l (R. 20 , 3 D . 3 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, d e f e n d a n t s convic t ions and 
sentence should be affirmed. 
o 7 7 ^ DATED t h i s ^ ^ day of March, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIDS 
Assistant Attorney General 
3 Had defendant based his claim on State constitutional grounds, 
respondent does not concede that Article I, §§ 10 and 12 would 
have necessarily produced a different result. Section 10 merely 
guarantees the right to trial by jury in capital cases. Section 
12 generally accords an accused the right to a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed. £&£. also Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-l-6(f). However, this Court has never analyzed these 
provisions in light of the federal authorities previously cited. 
Respondent is aware that Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides for a jury trial in misdemeanor cases upon 
written demand by the defendant at least ten days prior to trial. 
However, defendant has neither cited nor relied upon Utah 
statutory law in this appeal, nor cited to the record to 
establish that such a demand was timely made. ii££ Point I, 
supra. 
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